In
the last 6 years the Supreme Court accomplished something it had never
attempted since the founding of our country. The court examined, defined,
incorporated, and applied to the states the protection of an individual’s right
to possess a firearm in their home for private self-defense. Although the
court’s rulings in Heller and McDonald are considered landmark cases
in our country’s jurisprudence; both rulings essentially left judges,
legislators, and citizens with more questions than answers.
In
June 2008 the United States Supreme Court performed a thorough and in-depth examination
into the meaning of the Second Amendment. In the case of District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), with Justice Scalia writing
for the majority, the court held that the Second Amendment protects an
individual’s right to possess a firearm in their home for self-defense.
However, Justice Scalia made it clear that this right, like other rights, is
not unlimited. (Scalia, 2008) “
Nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings” (Scalia, 2008, p.54).
While
many scholars identify numerous issues within the 64 page opinion, arguably the
most important issue is the fact that the District of Columbia is not a state.
Rather it is a federal district, and therefore this ruling and newly identified
right apply only to the laws and actions of the federal government (Blackman,
2011). As a result, two questions
arise, whether this right should be protected from state actions, and if so,
under what constitutional provision should it be incorporated (Thomas, 2010)?
Those two questions were answered in June 2010 in the case of McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010).
Writing
for the majority in McDonald v. City of
Chicago (2010), Justice Alito restated that the Second Amendment right
identified in Heller protects the
right of an individual to possess a firearm in the home for self-defense and
that “We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller” (Alito, 2010, p. 44).
Analysis of Opinions
In
Heller, the court thoroughly analyzed
and gave us the meaning of the Second Amendment. However, many scholars sharply
criticized the courts failure to offer any clue as to the scope of the right in
the Second Amendment. Furthermore, the Heller
opinion did a poor job providing guidance to lower courts as to the proper method
of review that should be applied (Rosenthal,
Malcolm, 2011). Instead the majority’s opinion was primarily focused on
defining key phrases such as “Keep and bear arms, and the people” (Miller,
2009).
In
McDonald, the first half of Justice
Alito’s opinion reviews the historical background of incorporating the Bill of
Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment. He mentions that originally the Bill
of Rights applied only to the federal government until the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. After a lengthy historical review, he looked at
whether the right contained in the Second Amendment should be protected from
unlawful state actions as well as federal. He concluded that the right is in
fact protected from such unlawful actions by the states under the Due Process
Clause (Alito, 2010).
In
order to be considered for incorporation a right must be deemed “Fundamental to
our scheme of ordered liberty” (Alito, 2010, p.4). Moreover, to be fundamental,
a right must be “Deeply rooted in our nation’s history and traditions” (Alito,
2010, p.4). He concluded that the
framers and those that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment believed the right to
keep and bear arms was among such rights vital to our system of ordered
liberty. Therefore, the right is fundamental and is fully applicable to the
states (Alito, 2010).
Justice
Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion that sets out numerous arguments against the Heller opinion and against incorporation
of the right found in Heller. The
first of four points he argues is that the fear of the federal government
taking away the arms of the militia was the reason the Second Amendment was codified.
He then mentions that there is no consensus in America that the possession of a
firearm for self-defense is a fundamental right. Thirdly, he looks at the other
rights that have been incorporated and argues that unlike those rights, the
right to possess a firearm for self-defense does not advance any constitutional
objective (Oyez, 2009).
Specifically,
the constitutions objective to protect the rights of a minority against acts of
a majority, such as the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments effectively do.
Lastly he argues that there is a substantial reason to believe that the
incorporation of this right will drastically interfere with the constitutional
objectives of courts and legislatures and the states to the federal government.
Essentially he claimed that states have already established extensive laws and
regulations regarding firearms and by incorporating this new right, all such laws
and regulations are now subject to constitutional challenges. Furthermore, he
asks how federally appointed judges compared to elected representatives are
better suited to answer all of the questions that are sure to arise (Oyez, 2009).
Privileges
or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection
Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment holds:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.).
Arguably,
the first section contains the three most debated clauses in the United States
Constitution. In modern times only rights being violated under the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are sought for a remedy in court. Rarely
is there ever a claim made under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. This is
due to the extremely narrow interpretation the Supreme Court gave the
Privileges or Immunities Clause in the famous Slaughterhouse Cases (1873). To develop a basic understanding of
the clauses in section one it is helpful to understand the context and purpose
in which the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868.
In
1833 in the case of Barron v. Baltimore,
Chief Justice Marshall established that the Bill of Rights only applies to
actions of the federal government, not individual state actions (Alito, 2010).
The holding in Barron remained the
rule of law until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. After the Civil War, Congress successfully
passed legislation that established blacks and former slaves as citizens of The
United States. Such legislation like the Freedman’s Bureau Act of 1866 which in
part stated “That in every State or district where the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings has been interrupted by the rebellion, the constitutional
right to bear arms shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens of such
State or district without respect to race or color, or previous condition of
slavery” (Volokh, 2010, p.7). In short Congress wanted to ensure that newly
freed blacks were given all the same rights that white males held. However,
legislation did not keep former slave owners and confederate soldiers in the South
from treating blacks inhumanely (Alito,
2010).
As
it became increasingly evident that simple legislation could not protect blacks
and their newly recognized freedoms, the states ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment. The main goals of the amendment were to establish the requirements
of claiming American citizenship, to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states via the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and to layout the protections
citizens have from individual state action (Sandefur, 2010). However, before
the amendment was really given a chance to fully exercise its authority the
U.S. Supreme Court in the Slaughterhouse
Cases (1873) gave the Privileges or Immunities Clause an extremely limited interpretation.
Justice
Miller writing for the majority held “The Privileges and Immunities of citizens
of the United States are those which arise out of the nature and essential
character of the National government” (Nieto, 2011, p.1121). Basically he held that the clause only
protected a few rights that if not for the federal government would not exist (Nieto,
2011). Four years after its ratification, the amendment that was created to
apply the Bill of Rights to the states and to protect citizens rights from
unlawful state actions, appeared to be dead as a result of the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873).
For
roughly a half-century the Fourteenth Amendment saw little action in regards to
cases addressing the goals the amendment was founded on. However, in the early
20th Century the court began to look at whether or not the rights
contained in the Bill of Rights could be protected from state actions under the
Due Process Clause. The court eventually adopted the practice of selective
incorporation, and began incorporating the Bill of Rights under the Due Process
Clause and applying them to state action. It took most of the century, but
eventually the court incorporated nearly all of the rights protected in the
Bill of Rights (Alito, 2010).
The
last amendment in the Bill of Rights to be considered for incorporation was the
Second Amendment (Vernick, 2011). It wasn’t until 2008 in the Heller case that the Supreme Court found
an individual right to bear arms for self-defense protected by the Second
Amendment. Furthermore, it wasn’t until 2010 in the McDonald case that the Supreme Court held that the right identified
in Heller was deeply rooted in our
country’s history and traditions and that it was fundamental to American
citizenship; therefore making it fully applicable to the states (Alito, 2010).
Someone
not familiar with constitutional law probably has no idea what the Due Process
Clause means or how it works. The narrow interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause has been upheld for 140 years; therefore it appears safe to say that the
Due Process Clause has effectively replaced the Privileges or Immunities Clause
as the primary vehicle in which to limit state actions that infringe upon an
individual’s rights. We shall now turn to the questions of what the Due Process
Clause means and how does it work?
There
are two types of due process, procedural and substantive. When there is a case
claiming that some sort of state action or law is interfering or prohibiting an
individual from exercising any right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the
initial question a court asks is “Has the government deprived some person life,
liberty, or property” (Geller, 2007, p.1)?
Procedural due process spells out
the procedures the government must take in order to infringe or limit an
individual’s right(s) (Hass, 2006). For example if the government is going to
take your farm land to build a road it must give you a chance in court to
challenge its taking and then justly compensate you if the state ends up
actually taking it. Rights that fall under substantive due process, such as
freedom of speech, may not be taken away or limited by the government unless
the government can prove a compelling state interest in its reasoning and that
there are no other less restrictive ways to further that interest (Geller, 2007).
If
there has been some governmental action affecting a person’s right, the next
step is to look at whether or not the right affected is a fundamental right or
non-fundamental right. If it’s a fundamental right, like the right to possess a
firearm in the home for self-defense, any law or governmental action infringing
on that right faces strict scrutiny. The burden is placed on the government to
show that there is a compelling state interest that justifies their
interference (Harpaz, 2010). However, even if there is a
compelling interest shown it still may not be compelling enough to justify the
state’s interference in a person’s right. On the other hand if the right is
non-fundamental, a law or governmental action faces a rational basis test,
which is a much lower level of scrutiny. The state merely has to show a legitimate
ends to their action (Geller, 2007).
The
last clause in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment is the Equal Protection
Clause. The Equal Protection Clause prevents unreasonable discrimination based
certain classifications (Geller, 2008). There are three levels of review
applied to laws dealing with this clause and the Due Process Clause. Rational
basis review requires a state merely have legitimate ends. Falling under this
review would be non-fundamental rights and non-suspect classifications. A law
can treat different classes of people differently so long as it falls under the
rational basis review (Harpaz, 2010).
Next
is intermediate scrutiny, which requires that the states purpose be legitimate,
and its rationale for its treatment of different classes must be substantially
significant. Lastly we have strict
scrutiny, if a state’s treatment of a class of people is based on race or if it
burdens the fundamental rights of a class of people, it must prove a compelling
state interest in which there is no lesser form of differential treatment
available to achieve the goal of the state’s compelling interest (Harpaz, 2010).
In
sum, the Fourteenth Amendment was created primarily to protect the rights set
out in the Bill of Rights from state encroachment via the Privileges or Immunities
clause. However, the Supreme Court stripped the Privileges or Immunities clause
of any real meaning in the Slaughterhouse
Cases (1873) thus rendering the clause pretty much useless. Consequently,
the court developed the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to effectively
serve in place of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The court did so in
order to incorporate the Bill of Rights and apply them to the states (Alito,
2010).
In
the McDonald case the petitioners
argued that the right identified in Heller
should be incorporated under the Privileges or Immunities Clause and
applied to the states. The Supreme Court rejected their argument but did
incorporate the Heller right under
the Due Process Clause (Alito, 2010). What is interesting though is that even
if the petitioner’s Privileges or Immunities argument had been accepted by the
court, there really would not be much of a difference in the level of
protection of the right.
Even
if the Heller right was incorporated
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause it would still trigger strict scrutiny
when addressing a state action. The right identified in Heller was officially labeled as a fundamental right and therefore
any state law or action faces strict scrutiny when it clashes with this
fundamental right. The next section will look at the implications and possible
consequences resulting from the courts holding in McDonald.
Aftermath
of Heller and McDonald and their Implications
The question on most people’s minds following these
two cases is what affect did the rulings of the court have on D.C and Chicago’s
crime rates? In D.C. “From 2008-2010 homicides dropped -35%. Robbery with a gun
-10.3%. Assault with a gun, -24.1%. Total violent
crime -9.5%” (Lott, 2011)
In
Chicago from “Jan-Jun 2010 and Jan-Jun 2011, murder, -14%. Robbery -3.8%. Aggravated
assault and aggravated battery combined, -27.3%. Total violent crime, -8.8%”
(Lott, 2011). Although the national crime rates have been dropping for years,
D.C. and Chicago’s rates have surpassed it. Accordingly the notion of more guns
less crime may actually have some substance to it.
Soon after the McDonald opinion was read there was a flood of challenges against
federal, state, and local gun laws and regulations. One example is the case of United States v. Skoien (2010). The
challengers brought suit claiming that the federal law barring gun ownership by
people convicted of domestic violence charges was a violation of their Second
Amendment right to bear arms. The 3 judge panel of the 7th Circuit
Court of Appeals held the law to in fact be unconstitutional in violation of
his Second Amendment right to bear arms. However, on appeal to the full 7th
Circuit Court of Appeals the court upheld the law. In its opinion the court
stated that it applied intermediate scrutiny when reviewing the law (Vernick, Rutkow,
Webster, Teret, 2011). Looking back to the previous section of this paper we
know that intermediate scrutiny only requires that a state law be substantially
related to an important governmental interest. Had the court applied strict
scrutiny to the law the outcome may have been different.
What
makes this case even more interesting is the fact that the court relied heavily
on the findings of research regarding a few topics: the relationship between
domestic violence and firearms, recidivism among domestic abusers, and the risk
of guns in their homes (Vernick et al, 2011). The majority in the McDonald case held that when addressing
constitutional issues, the court does not base its ruling on statistics.
However, in his dissenting opinion Justice Breyer argued the exact opposite in
regards to Second Amendment issues.
He
states “This is a highly statistical matter. Without incorporation it’s decided
by legislatures, with incorporation it’s decided by judges” (Oyez, 2009). A few
moments later during oral arguments Justice Breyer goes on to say “There is
always a big area where its free speech versus a whole lot of things, but not
often is it free speech versus life. When it’s free speech versus life, we very
often decide in favor of life. Here every case will be one side guns on the
other side life. Statistics, balancing life versus guns” (Oyez, 2009).
Apparently the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Justice Breyer’s
argument that statistics must be considered.
In
both the Heller and McDonald cases one of the most common
criticisms of both cases are their lack of providing adequate guidance to lower
courts in regards to what standard of review should be used. Obviously as just
shown above, lower courts are unsure of how to weigh the right to bear arms
with a state’s compelling interest. Consequently,
we can most likely expect to see significant divergence among courts and their
approaches to Second Amendment cases. In other words, due to a lack of guidance
from the Supreme Court, one court may hold a law unconstitutional and another
court may hold a similar law constitutional.
The
Supreme Courts holding in both Heller
and McDonald also failed to address
and provide guidance for a number of important questions. Justice Breyer
mentions eight questions that lower courts are now expected to answer with no
guidance from the Supreme Court. His eight questions are:
1.
Should
the Second Amendment apply outside the home, the car, or at work?
2.
What
types of guns are allowed or considered ok for self-defense?
3.
Does
the time of day, place, or manner matter?
4.
Does
the presence of a child or convicted felon in the house matter?
5.
Are
special rules now needed for police and how they can pat down in search of a
gun?
6.
When
do registration requirements become severe to the point that they among to an
unconstitutional ban?
7.
Who
can possess guns?
8.
How
would the right interact with a state’s ability to take appropriate measures
during a national security emergency?
These are all valid
questions that courts are eventually going to be faced with (Blackman, 2011,
p.986). In the article by Vernick he suggests that social researchers need to
be ready to help courts in answering these questions. Furthermore, he mentions
that researchers also need to be prepared to assist legislators in creating
laws that will not violate the Constitution (Vernick et al, 2011).
Make no mistake; Indiana is not exempt from the
implications of the Heller and McDonald cases. In 2011 Indiana enacted
a law that prohibits employers from prohibiting their employees from keeping a
lawfully owned firearm unloaded and locked in their vehicle while at work. Also
in 2011 Indiana passed a law that prohibits local governments in from enacting
any type of firearm regulation that is not mentioned in the Indiana Code. In
other words Indiana’s General Assembly wanted to establish uniform firearm laws
throughout all parts of the state. Therefore, unless it’s already in the
Indiana Code, a city may not pass a more restrictive firearm regulation (Bischoff,
2010).
The Supreme Court handed down two landmark decisions
nearly back to back. The court identified a new right for an individual to bear
arms in their home for self-defense. Furthermore, the court defined that right
as being fundamental, thus warranting incorporation and application to the
states under the Due Process Clause. However, the Supreme Court clearly created
more questions and issues than it answered. At this very moment there are
numerous cases making their way through the judicial system and it is very
likely that a few of these will be heard by the Supreme Court in the near
future. One such case is Britt v. State
(2009), in which North Carolina became the first state in the country to
hold that a law criminalizing an ex-felon from possessing a firearm to be a
violation of their Second Amendment right and therefore is unconstitutional (Bone,
2010).
Conclusion
Until
the Supreme Court hears and rules on more Second Amendment cases, it appears
for now, that judges, legislatures, and citizens are going to have to simply
deal with the implications and confusion left in the aftermath of Heller and McDonald. However, if D.C. and Chicago continue to see decreases in
their violent crime rates, perhaps dealing with the implications will not be so
bad for those following suit. Despite the numerous uncertainties regarding the
right itself, one thing is certain. When creating laws and analyzing cases,
Judges and legislators are now going to have to take into consideration
empirical research when balancing life vs. guns, and they must exercise extreme
caution and scrutiny in doing so. A failure to do so may result in catastrophic
consequences.
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